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a b s t r a c t
From the early days of the information economy, personal data has been its most valuable
asset. Despite data protection laws and an acknowledged right to privacy, trading personal
information has become a business equated with “trading oil”. Most of this business is
done without the knowledge and active informed consent of the people. But as data
breaches and abuses are made public through the media, consumers react. They become
irritated about companies' data handling practices, lose trust, exercise political pressure
and start to protect their privacy with the help of technical tools. As a result, companies'
Internet business models that are based on personal data are unsettled. An open conflict is
arising between business demands for data and a desire for privacy. As of 2015 no true
answer is in sight of how to resolve this conflict. Technologists, economists and regulators
are struggling to develop technical solutions and policies that meet businesses' demand for
more data while still maintaining privacy. Yet, most of the proposed solutions fail to ac-
count for market complexity and provide no pathway to technological and legal imple-
mentation. They lack a bigger vision for data use and privacy. To break this vicious cycle,
we propose and test such a vision of a personal information market with privacy. We
accumulate technical and legal measures that have been proposed by technical and legal
scholars over the past two decades. And out of this existing knowledge, we compose
something new: a four-space market model for personal data.
© 2015 Sarah Spiekermann & Alexander Novotny. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.
“Only those who know the goal, find the way” Laotse (604
BCe531 BC).
1. Introduction
“Personal data is the new oil of the Internet and the new
currency of the digital world” (2011). With these words
Meglena Kunewa, Europe's prior commissioner in chief of
consumer protection, expressed a current economic reality.
Personal information (hereafter abbreviated as “PI”) is at the
core of online business models: it is regarded as the Holy Grail
to gain the attention of users (Brynjolfsson and Oh, 2012). It
also drives innovation because it promotes a better under-
standing of customer needs and reduces corporate cost and
risks. Drawing on the analytics of Big PI Data, businesses try to
avoid targeting the wrong customers, running into credit de-
faults, or hiring the wrong staff. Due to these benefits, the
Boston Consulting Group predicts that the economic use of PI
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can deliver up to V 330 billion in annual economic benefit for
organizations in Europe by 2020 (Bcg, 2012). The use of PI and
its availability in emerging PI markets follow the predictions
of neoclassical economic theory, which says that complete
information and transparency creates economic efficiency
(Posner, 1978).
However, the strive for economic efficiency is challenged.
People's legal right to keep their PI private and their right to
informational self-determination (at least in Europe) limit
marketers' push for the unrestricted flow and use of PI. Across
the globe, regulators and human rights activists that see
people's identities commercialized fight the “glass human
being”. Across jurisdictions a delicate balance needs to be
found between peoples' human right to privacy and data
protection on one side and economic efficiency on the other
(Wef, 2012).
To date, this balance has not been found. From a natural
and legal point of view, only customer relationship holding
institutions (hereafter abbreviated as “CR-H” for “Customer
Relationship Holders”) should actually be entitled to use PI for
the legitimate purpose of delivering agreed-upon services to
customers. However, because PI is such an enticing tradable
asset a plethora of data brokers have emerged to pursue more
or less legitimate PI trade. An impressive “shadow market”
(Conger et al., 2013, p. 406) for personal data has evolved that
benefits from a current lack of global technical standards for
controlling and auditing data flows. Nobody knows for sure
who shares which PI with whom, in what form and on what
occasions. Besides this nontransparent distribution structure
of the PI market, data collection ismostly happening invisibly,
without the full knowledge and true consent of customers
(Angwin, 2012).
This status quo is unsatisfactory for all market actors
involved. Customers and data protection authorities have
reason to complain because they see the legal promise of
informational self-determination and privacy increasingly
eroded. For CR-Hs, the PI market lacks transparency and fails
to create the necessary accountability and trust that is
required for creating a predictive market environment. The
markets' shadow existence undermines its own long-term
viability, making all its players operate at the edge of what is
ethically sustainable. A lack of accountability and trans-
parency leads to an arbitrary valuation of the PI asset. And, as
we will argue, it also fosters market concentration and im-
pedes service innovation. Finally, different approaches to
privacy regulation in the U.S., Europe andAsia lead to tensions
that threaten data exchange.
Against this background, we strongly believe that a solid
new vision is needed for how the PI market can work effi-
ciently while providing privacy protection and informational
self-determination. We don't think that global PI markets can
simply muddle along with some technical and legal measures
and compromises here and there. Instead we need a PI mar-
ket, where
▪ companies handle PI transparently and accountably,
▪ long-term consumer trust is ensured,
▪ concentrated PI monopolies (or oligopolies) are broken up
to make information more accessible to more companies
on a global basis,
▪ and informational self-determination and privacy of cus-
tomers is ensured.
If this is the goal, what legal measures would need to be
taken? And what technical standards would be needed to
enable these legal measures?
The contribution of this paper is that it provides a specific
analysis how privacy-enhancing technologies and privacy/
data protection law could together balance the right to privacy
with market efficiency in order to create a trustful PI market.
We present a vision of technical and legal bridges between
continents that could be used by information systems and
computer science researchers, standardization bodies and
policy makers to challenge, streamline and prioritize current
privacy regulation initiatives and technical developments.We
believe that such a vision is a highly important tool, because
what we need in this field is direction. As Laotse said once:
“Only those who know the goal find the way”. Many aspects of
the goal to have privacy-friendly digital services have been
described already. Over two decades, legal and technical
scholars in the field of data protection and privacy have
dedicated their scientific lives to propose solutions to various
aspects of privacy-friendly markets. Our aim in this article is
to bundle the voices of these scholars into a chorus and to
show how their solutions can be put together and integrated
into one vision picture.
So far, only a few scholars have theorized about how a PI
market vision could be organized with privacy in mind
(Laudon, 1996; Noam, 1997; Schwartz, 2003; Aperjis and
Huberman, 2012). These scholars have typically envisioned a
market where people legally own and control their data,
selling PI usage rights to data brokers under various organi-
zational conditions. However, their proposed models fail to
grasp the complexity of today's data handling practices;
including the grown power structure of data markets. They
hardly integrate the existing technological and legal land-
scape. And they provide no pathway to empower customers.
This article takes a different approach. We embrace exist-
ing work in the field of privacy research and outline how it
could be leveraged in the current economic and technical
environment. We show how privacy-enhancing technologies
that allow for accountability (Pearson and Mont, 2011), agent-
based privacy preference management (e.g., Cranor et al.,
2006), cloud computing (e.g., Pearson and Charlesworth,
2009), anonymization (e.g., k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002)),
and differential privacy (Dwork, 2006) could be used to turn
around today's adverse PI market situation. We think about
incentives of current actors to participate in themarket vision
we propose. And we argue that only a symbiosis of “code and
law” (Lessig, 2006) can produce an efficient PI market where
customer rights to privacy are maintained.
To develop our PI market vision, we initially proposed a 3-
tier market model (Novotny and Spiekermann, 2013) that
categorized current PI market players into three groups: (1)
CR-Hs involved in direct service- and PI exchange with cus-
tomers, (2) data processing companies servicing CR-Hs and (3)
third parties (including data brokers), which would work
purely on anonymized data. This model was critically dis-
cussed and challenged in the course of 13 in-depth interviews
with world-leading data protection experts (denoted hereafter
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as [I]) and a workshop with the European advertisement in-
dustry (denoted hereafter as [W]). The insights we gained
through this empirical validation of our initial thoughts led to
a new and final PI market vision that we present in this article.
To present our visionary market model, this article is
structured as follows: In the next section, we give an overview
of our market model vision. Then, we describe our method-
ology for elaborating and evaluating our PI market vision. We
then describe our model in detail, outlining how experts have
judged the pros and cons of our ideas.We summarize all of the
legal and technical enablers that would be needed to put our
vision into practice in table form. The paper closes with a
critical discussion of our model's benefits and challenges.
2. The vision: a four-space market model for
personal data and privacy in a nutshell
With his remark “Sapientis est ordinare” (Wisdom means to
create order) Thomas Acquinas once hinted to the crucial
power of order. To regain order, to create market trans-
parency, trust and accountability, our vision is a PI market
that contains four “spaces” and assigns standardized data
handling and exchange rules to each of these spaces. We
assign all PImarket players to one space, though one company
may take on different roles when they provide different ser-
vices. Rules in each market space need to be enforced by
technical infrastructure and regulation.
The first market space, which we call “customer relation-
ship space” (1), includes customers and CR-Hs directly
involved in a service exchange. For example, book buyer Bob
may be a bookshop's customer, and the CR-H might be an
online bookshop called bookshop.com.
The second market space, which we call “CR-H-controlled
data space” (2), includes the distributed computing and ser-
vice infrastructures that enables today's electronic business
relationships. This space includes all companies providing
services to the CR-H that directly enable and enrich the
customer relationship. For example, a company in the CR-H-
controlled data space could be the cloud service provider
CloudServ, which handles purchase data for the CR-H
bookshop.com.
The third market space, which we call “customer-
controlled data space” (3), includes services that grant cus-
tomers ownership of their PI and manage and control it in a
privacy-friendly way. A service operating in the third market
space could be MyShoppingBird, which collects book deals
from various vendors, including bookshop.com under the
control of buyer Bob.
The fourthmarket space, whichwe call “safe harbor for big
data” (4), grants equal access to anonymized people data to all
market entities that need it. For example, the market research
agency NielsSearch could download aggregated people data
from the safe big data space to analyze and forecast future
consumer trends in the bookmarket. Participants in this “safe
harbor for big data” can provide and process as much data as
they want, but the data they handle must be anonymized.
The safe harbor for big data is filled with data originating
from PI. Yet, each time PI is transferred to the safe harbor for
big data, it must pass an “anonymity frontier”. In fact, when PI
leaves the context of an identified customer relationship and
is transferred to an entity that is not involved in the customer
relationship context, PI must cross the anonymity frontier.
The anonymity frontier is operated according to “Best Avail-
able Techniques” (BATs) for anonymization.
Fig. 1 summarizes the four components of our market
model vision plus the anonymity frontier.
Ourmarketmodel vision has twomajor assumptions: First,
we assume that societies can live with a “good enough” level
of privacy protection for individuals. Our market model does
not have a level of privacy protection that arms individuals
against intentional, targeted attacks by organizations or
criminals. We adopt the principle of proportionality that aims
to balance economic utility with privacy (Iachello and Abowd,
2005). For instance, we embrace the fact that with access to
voluminous data sets, anonymous data can theoretically be
re-identified. Some criminal attackers may engage in such
efforts even at the risk of criminal prosecution. But similar to
locked cars and flats that can always be broken, we accept that
anonymization techniques are “good enough” to thwart a lot
of the crime potential.
Second, we assume that societies are ready to grant in-
dividuals the right to determine the fate of their PI. Informa-
tional self-determination can protect individuals from
“information-rich perceptions by others” (Kaiser, 2012, p. 61).
Control over personal information circulating in the market is
at the heart of protecting privacy. In fact, privacy is often
conceptualized as promoting control over one's personal in-
formation (Westin, 1968; Belanger and Crossler, 2011, p. 1018)
or as an ongoing process of controlling who has access to the
self (Altman, 1977). Our market model therefore gives in-
dividuals the right to choose whether to participate in any
collection, processing, or use of PI, and it recognizes that
customers might reveal their personal data for benefits they
value more than their data.
3. Method for evaluating the market vision
The interviews and the workshop to evaluate the market
vision took place between October 2012 and March 2013.
Interview partners included representatives from companies
Fig. 1 e Illustration of market model vision for personal
data markets and privacy.
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(including IBM, HP, Metro Group), standardization bodies
(including the W3C DNT working group), data protection
authorities (including ULD SchleswigeHolstein), data brokers
(including a major credit-scoring agency), industry associa-
tions (including IAB), legal counseling groups and one NGO
(EDRI). On average, interviewees had 11 years of work
experience in the privacy domain. Although 12 of the 13
interview partners are based in Europe, eight are involved in
global privacy efforts and working groups. Depending on
their experience we made interviewees focus on at least one
of the three “tiers” in our initial market model. The in-
terviews and the workshop were audio taped and tran-
scribed. The interviews lasted around 1 h, and the workshop
lasted 2.5 h.
Methodologically, we used a topic guide for interview
consistency. After an initial question on interviewees' role and
experience in the privacy field, we briefly introduced an initial
version of themarketmodel we had developed ourselves. This
model is published in the Digital Enlightenment Yearbook
2013 (Novotny and Spiekermann, 2013). Interviewees were
then asked to apply their own work experience to that market
model. For example, we asked the W3C's DNT group repre-
sentative to comment on ourmodel's proposal to adopt agent-
based (automated) privacy preference management for users
to express consent; representatives from the credit rating
agency were asked about the anonymization of data for
brokering practices, etc. After this initially focused discussion,
six core concepts of our market model were systematically
evaluated in detail: (1) anonymization, (2) data use policies
and their standardization, (3) technical accountability and
auditability, (4) using and sharing anonymized information,
(5) ownership rights in personal information, and (6) the
transparent separation of service delivery from information
exchange.
Interview transcriptions were analyzed for issues and ar-
guments the experts raised on a topic (Froschauer and Lueger,
2003). First, in awithin-interview analysis, passages in the text
relating to one argument were paraphrased and summarized.
Second, headlines were assigned to the paraphrased text
passages; where possible, these were taken directly from text.
Third, we compared all passages relating to one issue across
the texts of different experts and the workshop, revealing the
central arguments and core dimensions relating to each issue.
Our analysis did not necessarily give preference to the inter-
pretation of the majority of experts. Rather, disagreement
between experts enriched arguments for and against our
market model (Dorussen et al., 2005, p. 324). In a final step, we
revised our initial model by incorporating the new ideas from
the experts and outlined our final vision that is now going to
be described in the next sections.
In the following sections, we outline the motivation,
function, legal requirements, technical enablers and chal-
lenges in each of the four spaces. We also discuss the behav-
ioral incentives of all market participants. We show that our
market model encourages the development of innovative
services based on PI and anonymized people data while
ensuring a privacy-friendly use of customer's PI. Many of our
arguments were finally supported and derived from the in-
terviewswe conducted; going beyond the initialmarketmodel
we had come up with ourselves.
4. A critical discussion of the four-space
market model and its components
In the following, we will discuss the four spaces of our revised
market model in detail.
4.1. The 1st market space: customer relationship space
The core of the customer relationship space is the re-
establishment of one-to-one business relationships. Com-
panies that invest in a customer relationship need and want
identified customer relationships (Spiekermann et al., 2003).
Andmany customers arewilling to provide their PI in a service
context if it is necessary for service delivery or if they receive
appropriate returns for their data. Therefore, our market
model departs from the traditional data protection call for
anonymity vis-a-vis direct CR-Hs (Gritzalis, 2004; Bella et al.,
2011). Currently, an individual online customer often deals
with multiple (n) parties collecting PI simultaneously during
an electronic transaction with a CR-H. For instance, an
average of 56 tracking companies monitor people's trans-
actions on commercial news portals (Angwin, 2012). Thus, CR-
Hs often serve as gateways to the shadow market of com-
panies brokering PI. Our model requires that only the one CR-
H that is visible to the customer is allowed to collect PI in the
context of an exchange. This one-visible-partner rule is
monitored by technical accountability-management plat-
forms that are regularly audited and safeguarded by legal
sanctions (see Section 6). Moreover, CR-Hs become liable for
the proper handling of the PI they collect. All PI they receive is
recognized as being owned by the respective customer and
can be used by the CR-H only for purposes set down in elec-
tronic PI usage policies, which accompany each piece of PI
exchanged. The PI and policy exchange are automated with
the help of privacy exchange protocols (such as P3P (Cranor,
2012) or HTTP-A (Seneviratne, 2012)) that require minimal
user configuration. These policies are the basis of a technically
enabled and legally enforced accountability scheme govern-
ing later PI exchange in the CR-H-controlled data space.
Finally, we suggest a right to a privacy-friendly service
version, implying the conscious separation of a service ex-
change from its information exchange.
In the customer relationship space, we require identified
one-to-one transactions and CR-H liability in order to ensure
predictability of the outcomes of business transactions. Cus-
tomers and CR-Hs are better able to appraise the costs of
engaging in a business transaction when they have more in-
formation about the partner they are dealing with (Coase,
1960). Well-known transaction partners who send positive
reputational signals are more likely awarded with trust in a
business relationship (Puncheva, 2008). Especially in elec-
tronic environments, being able to see, perceive and feel a
transaction partner increases the likelihood of engaging in a
transaction (Aldiri et al., 2008). We re-establish predictability
and trust in business transactions by forbidding third parties
to invisibly observe customer relationships in the background.
The latter practice is what causes many people to lose control
over data collection. This again promotes distrust in electronic
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transactions and the CR-H (Smith et al., 1996; Spiekermann,
2005).
The following sections justify the characteristics of this
space from an economic and human rights perspective and
detail their technical and legal implementation (summarized
in Table 1).
4.1.1. Principle of one-partner identification, visibility and
liability
Predictability is supported when users deal with only one
visible PI-collecting CR-H at a time. We define transaction
partner visibility as a state in which customers visiting an
electronically enabled premise can unambiguously and
effortlessly name the entity that they are transacting with;
customers have an accurate mental model of who they are
entrusting with their personal data. Transaction partner vis-
ibility is natural in the offline context. Customers visiting a
physical retail store such as Walldepot perceive Walldepot as
their CR-H. Likewise, in the online environment, when a user
enters a bookseller portal such as bookshop.com, the visible
partner brand is bookshop.com.
The concept of transaction partner visibility enables users
to trust in the contextual integrity of their PI use (Nissenbaum,
2004). The contextual integrity of PI is preserved if disclosure
and distribution of personal information adheres to socially
accepted norms of appropriateness in a given social situation.
Being able to identify one visible transaction partner is a social
norm under which disclosure of personal data is appropriate.
Users want identified relationships in which they can control
the use of their PI. Contextual integrity is also a requirement
for legitimate PI use. Any data exchange between customers
and CR-Hs and any further PI use should be related to the
transaction's purpose. Uses of collected PI unrelated to the
transaction are illegitimate and the CR-H is held liable.
In contrast to what is common today, our market vision
requires that the only entities entitled to collect or receive PI
are those that invest in a one-to-one business relationship
with a customer or that are assigned by the CR-H to help fulfill
the contractual purposes. Today's data aggregators, trackers
and brokers would need to invest in direct and visible service
transactions with customers if they want to receive data.
Alternatively, they can leverage their data processing knowl-
edge and become players in the anonymous safe harbor for big
data described below.
4.1.2. Ownership of personal information
A core component of ourmodel is that customers have a claim
to own their PI, regardless of where it is held. Themain reason
for establishing an ownership claim to PI is a psychological
one: “ownership” of PI creates asset awareness in theminds of
all stakeholders. Customers who are aware that PI is an eco-
nomic resource used to generate economic value make more
informed decisions about disclosing PI (Spiekermann et al.,
2012). Equally, companies will be more cautious and reflec-
tive in collecting and using PI if they are aware that they do not
own the data; that the data is not their, but the customer's
property. For these psychological reasons, we originally
embraced the term “property right” to personal data as
Table 1 e Legal and technical enablers in the customer relationship space.
Mutual identity
management
standards
Standardized graphical
user interface symbols
for signaling PI usage
policies and
CR-holding companies
Software agent-
supported
PI usage policy
negotiation and
exchange
Client-side
policy
repository
PI usage policy
languages with
standard vocabulary
Legal requirements Technical enablers
Mandatory ‘1-visible-partner’
rule
x x
Self-regulated standard on
what is considered direct
support of the CR to
maintain contextual
integrity
x
CR-holding companies
obtain legitimization
for PI use by:
 informed consent or
 legal empowerment
x x x x
Liability of CR-holding
company for handling
PI in accordance with
electronic PI usage policies
x x x
Recognition of customers' PI
ownership
x
Mandatory separation of the
service deal from the PI deal
x x x
Obligation to offer one service
option with minimum
information use at
reasonable quality and price
x x x
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suggested by U.S. legal scholars in the field (Samuelson, 1999;
Schwartz, 2003).
Ownership claims are compatible with the human rights
perspective of informational self-determination. The
informed consent principle (Art 7 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 7
General Data Protection Regulation-draft (2012), Para. 7 OECD
guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows
of personal data, Art 2 FTC Fair Information Practices (FIP))
and the right to object (Art 14 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 19 Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation-draft (2012)) reflect that data
subjects have the biggest interest in controlling the fate of
their PI (Purtova, 2011). To recognize the human rights char-
acter of privacy, ownership claims to a data subject's PI cannot
be alienated (Bergelson, 2003; Schwartz, 2003). In our model,
only usage rights to PI can be traded for customers to better
participate in personal data markets. This principle comple-
ments current data protection law and greatly facilitates
customers' legal recourse (Buchner, 2011).
Our interviewees confirmed that customers “intuitively
have a right into their [personal] information anyways”[I4] and
recognized that the notion of ownership of one's personal
information is simple and comprehensible. One expert argued
that data ownership “can be easily grasped by people” [I11].
Still, the majority of experts advised that the “ownership”
of PI should be distinguished from private “property” rights.
Many experts feared that viewing PI as property would not
address the social complexity inherent in interpersonal re-
lationships. A commercialization of individuals' identity
seems to contradict the human rights perspective on privacy.
Many experts therefore felt that a direct legal analogy with
private property could be misleading. For instance, one expert
pointed out that applying property laws to the use of PI by
public sector institutions would imply an “expropriation each
time…” and that would be “an odd construction” [I12]. Experts
advised embracing the term “ownership” instead of “property
right” [I1, I7, I8, I10, I11]. Viktor Mayer-Sch€onberger (2010, p.
1877) uses the term “quasi-property rights” to avoid confusion
with property rights in a legal sense.
Regardlessofexperts' reservations, ourproposal'sownership
claims are compatible with the human rights perspective of
informational self-determination. The informed consent prin-
ciple (Art 7 Directive 95/46/EC, Art 7 General Data Protection
Regulation-draft (2012), Para. 7 OECD guidelines on the protec-
tion of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, Art 2 FTC
Fair Information Practices (FIP)) and the right to object (Art 14
Directive 95/46/EC, Art 19 General Data Protection Regulation-
draft (2012)) reflect thatdata subjectshave thebiggest interest in
controlling the fate of their PI (Purtova, 2011). To recognize the
human rights character of privacy, ownership claims to a data
subject's PI cannot be alienated (Bergelson, 2003; Schwartz,
2003). In our model, only usage rights to PI can be traded for
customers to better participate in personal data markets. This
principle complements current data protection law and greatly
facilitates customers' legal recourse (Buchner, 2011).
4.1.3. Personal agent support of customers and legitimized PI
use
For the past 15 years, scholars have been working on privacy-
enhancing technologies that facilitate (Mcdonald et al., 2009),
automate (e.g., in scope of the PRIME Life project (Bussard
et al., 2011)), and standardize (Cranor et al., 2013) the
communication of privacy preferences. For example, people
might object to data processing for credit scoring purposes or
request deletion of their data after a period of time. Software
agent (automated consent) solutions enable people to
configure their privacy preferences in their IT clients (i.e., in
the browser) and exchange these preferences with data con-
trollers through PI policy exchange protocols. One of the most
renowned software agent solutions has been the Platform for
Privacy Preferences Project led by the W3C (P3p, 2006). Recent
technical proposals going into the same direction is the HTTP-
Accountability protocol proposed by Tim Berners Lee's group
at MIT (Seneviratne, 2012) as well as the concept of “dynamic
consent” developed for the UK health sector (Kaye et al., 2014).
Software agents facilitate the communication of privacy
preferences to CR-Hs. Configuration effort is limited because
the software agent learns the privacy preferences of the
customer over time (Lodder and Voulon, 2002). The user's
software agent compares PI usage preferences with com-
panies' PI usage policies. The agent then signals to the user
which service options or CR-Hs may be the most appropriate
to engage with (similar to the ‘Privacy Bird’ presented in
(Cranor et al., 2006)). It can also support negotiation of PI usage
policies. The agent must ensure a voluntary, unambiguous,
prior, verifiable customer agreement (Pachinger, 2012). It
stores the usage policy and the contextual parameters of the
customer relationship in which the policy is valid in a
metadata-based architecture, such as the one proposed by
Microsoft (Nguyen et al., 2013). The CR-H signals its consent
and commitment to the PI usage policy to the user so that the
user has a copy of the terms. The return-signal, potentially an
extended version of today's DoNotTrack Feedback function,
can act as a kind of receipt that records what PI has been
provided to whom under what conditions.
By using a standardized, agent-based privacy preference
exchange, standard PI usage policies are created for both
customers and CR-Hs. These standardized PI usage policies
are a basis for legitimized PI use in personal data markets. PI
usage policies must be standardized. Standardized policies
similar to the creative commons license types formulate the
terms unambiguously and are easy to understand for con-
sumers (Cranor, 2012). Moreover, they can be verified by cus-
tomers when they view the settings of their personal agent
(Art29wp, 2013).
The online advertising industry welcomed personal agent
support of an informed consent, because this user-friendly
way of giving consent seems to be the only way to make
informed consent work. Today's manual consent to PI sharing
is a too laborious and burdensome task [W]. One expert [I9]
gave an example where a European DPA enforced cookie
consent using modal pop-up windows on a company's web-
site. As users had to consent each time before they were able
to read the website, the number of users dropped by ninety
percent. Seen such examples for manual consent, agent sup-
port was seen as a new avenue the industry could go. How-
ever, in order for personal agent-supported consent to be
legally valid, oneDPA-representative [I12] counter-argued that
automating privacy-decisions would be problematic since
consent would need to be given on a case-by-case basis.
Configuring preferences beforehand and giving consent to all
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future cases would not be sufficient for the consent to be
“informed”. The compromise seems to be that personal agents
need to nudge users into actively engaging with privacy set-
tings [I9]. To fulfill the requirement of affirmative action,
“users need to be forced to actively engage with the settings of their
agents and browsers.” [I9]
That said, many experts were skeptical that personal agent
supported PI usage policy negotiationwould resolve the current
“take-it-or-leave-it choice” that companies confront their cus-
tomers with [I8]. The market asymmetry between CR-Hs and
consumers would remain and undermine agent-based negoti-
ation unless the legislator outlawed a coupling of services with
data exchange. To alleviatemarket asymmetry, additional legal
requirements, such as the right to a privacy-friendly service are
therefore required as a complement (see below).
4.1.4. Separation of service and information exchange and the
right to a privacy-friendly service
Today, most online transactions are of a composite nature. In-
formation is collected as a service spin-off (Jentzsch et al., 2012,
p. 9) without making the ‘information deal’ visible to the
customer. In our model, CR-Hs distinguish the service and in-
formation exchangewithin a business relationship. The service
exchange includes the delivery of the principal service to the
customer. For example, the principal service might be the sale
and delivery of a book. Partners must offer one service option
that requires customers to disclose only theminimum amount
of PI necessary to fulfill the core service. Thus, people always
have the right to a privacy-friendly service. Consider, for
example, a web search engine. An individual opens the search
engine's website, look.com. Selected by default, a privacy-
friendly option may require the individual to pay a subscrip-
tion fee of V 1 per month; this option neither records search
queries nor shows anypersonalizedads. In contrast, the second
option could cost V 1.50. This option collects more PI and only
uses it for an agreed time period to provide a richer service
experience, such as individualized search results (a better ser-
vice compared to the first option's service is more expensive).
The third option commercially leverages users' PI for an agreed
time period for purposes such as the targeted placement of
advertisements. This option may be provided for free. Users
consciously trade theirPI inexchange for the freesearchservice.
The example demonstrates that the model would create
awareness of the value of an online service on one side and
the value of PI on the other side. Services won't necessarily
come for free by default any more. The ‘free’ mentality gov-
erning online business relationships today would make room
for a more realistic view of what digital services are worth.
The advertising industry is convinced that if it is legitimate for
a service to charge a fee, customers would be ready to pay [W].
Companies claim that personalized services enriched by PI
provide value to the customer. If that claim is correct, cus-
tomers should also be willing to pay for a better service
quality, one expert argues [I7].
But PI won't come for free either. Customers knowingly
exchange their PI for a benefit, extending on strict data
minimization. The separation of service options would
improve the salience of the information transaction and
encourage customers to make conscious decisions on infor-
mation deals (Jentzsch et al., 2012, p. 10). Regulators believe
that the separation of service and information exchange can
help bringing more transparency into PI markets [I7]. Trans-
parency is desperately needed, because customers are not
aware that they pay with their PI in these markets [I8].
4.1.5. Incentives of actors to embrace our customer
relationship space proposal
Customers are motivated to use personal agents to manage
their privacy for several reasons: One is that they feel an
increasing need to be protected from advertisements. 43% of
online users use ad-blocking software today, a share expected
to rise to 100% by 2018 (Pagefair, 2013). Another reason is that
people's fear of losing privacy is increasing (Fujitsu, 2010), as is
their computer literacy. Myriad companies have been founded
in recent years that work towards customer-controlled archi-
tectures (Pdec, 2014). Software agentswill improve the usability
and information quality of informed consent procedures for
customers. Instead of requiring customers to click checkboxes
manually, they enable seamless rightsmanagement (Friedman
et al., 2005). Moreover, if they empower people to manage the
ownership of andusage rights to PI, theyalso technically enable
customers to participate in personal data markets.
The one-partner rule enables CR-Hs to regain their rightful
and exclusive control over PI collection in their transactions.
Some CR-Hs, such as news portals and telecom operators,
have lost this control in past years. Hence, the CR-H controlled
customer relationship space will ‘re-decentralize’ the collec-
tion and analysis of PI profiles in the hands of those who have
nourished and built customer relationships. They should
therefore be able to exclusively benefit from their customers'
profile data. The control over data collection will also allow
CR-Hs to re-establish accountability in their customer re-
lationships, which is currently eroded by the multitude of
parallel data collectors. Accountability is a vital requirement
in Europe's new data protection legislation (Com, 2012).
CR-Hs should be willing to implement policy-based data
exchange protocols because it facilitates consent procedures,
automatically creates legal compliance for the data collected
and may even improve the quality of data collected, as cus-
tomers feel more comfortable entrusting them with timely
and more complete data.
4.1.6. Challenges
Market complexity may hinder the re-introduction of identi-
fied customer relationships based on the principle of the one-
partner rule. In today's multi-entity service networks, it is
difficult to distinguish between the different roles entities are
taking on. “Who is really the data controller…where am I, in service
delivery, or at a third party?” one legal advisory expert [I9] said,
challenging our approach. Identification of the one company
truly holding the CR-H may initially not be straightforward,
though we believe that companies' market power will ulti-
mately provide a clear definition. For sure, companies and the
market as a whole would gain transparency regarding who
actually owns the customer relationship.
Another challenge is for CR-Hs to draw the right line to
maintain the contextual integrity of the PI they collect. In-
dustries must establish standard rules for what is considered
‘legitimized’ use of PI in a context. Those companies operating
in the “shadow market” will be challenged to transform their
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business models into legitimate ones. Respecting the one-
visible-partner-rule, they will need to start providing services
maintaining the contextual integrity of the PI they use.
Agreement also needs to be reached on what the ‘neces-
sary’minimumamount of PI is to fulfill a privacy-friendly core
service. There is no simple formula for designing privacy-
friendly services. Rather, trade-offs between functionality,
usability, and processed PI have to be made on a case-by-case
basis to ensure good-enough-privacy. The principle of pro-
portionality has been applied successfully to make decisions
of this kind (Iachello and Abowd, 2005).
Due to the numerous challenges that surround the well-
established concept of informed consent, some have proposed
to annihilate it completely. Critics of consent argue that
obtaining it is practically burdensome, that customers are not
truly informed, do not understand the consequences of giving
consent, lack real choice in take-it-or-leave-it service offerings,
or should not be able to trade away their data essential to their
core of privacy. Others suggested that customers should not
consent to the collection andprocessingof their data, but rather
to the release of their comprehensive digital personas (Mpx,
2014). We believe though that we need not and must not give
up on the informational self-determination of customers (i.e.,
control over data). The mechanisms our model proposes in the
customer relationship space can support overcoming informed
consent's burdensome handling; turning it instead into an
effective instrument of customer control. As EdgarWhitley has
argued alongside the UK's Technology Strategy Board, it is
possible to give “consent as reliable and easy as turning on a tap
and revoking that consent as reliable and easy as turning it off
again.” (Whitley, 2009). A combination of automated personal
consent agents, one-partner visibility, true choice by obligatory
privacy-friendly service offerings and ownership of personal
data can facilitate such an effective, true and meaningful con-
trol for customers. Hard-law should mandate CR-Hs to obtain
informed consent for legitimizing PI use not only under Euro-
pean legislation, but also in the U.S. and on an international
basis.
Finally, PI usage policies may have scalability problems.
Customerswill not give separate consent for all transactions (Le
Metayer and Monteleone, 2009), but their agents will need to
provide appropriate responses to all consent situations. The
agents will therefore need to learn and embed heuristics for
disclosure decisions. They need to assure that agreed-upon PI
usage policies are enforced within global service webs, which
can be difficult given the number of shadow market players
hungry for PI.
4.2. The 2nd market space: CR-H controlled data space
The CR-H is not the only party involved in the delivery of
services and products. Subcontracting, outsourcing, and
strategic alliances across multiple organizations are today's
default. This complex service web of subcontractors receiving
PI reduces the transparency and security of PI markets. Con-
sumers aremost concerned about secondary uses of their data
by such invisible partners (Belanger and Crossler, 2011). For
this reason, we recognize the service web behind a CR-H as a
market space that should be “controlled” by the CR-H, because
the CR-H is that entity, which is finally seen as accountable for
data breaches by data subjects. We therefore establish a ‘CR-
H-controlled’ data space.
The CR-H-controlled data space comprises all those sub-
contractors under control of the CR-H that directly contribute
to the delivery of the CR-H's services. To ensure contextual
integrity, sub-contractors contributions must be such that
their receipt of PI can be anticipated by or justifiable to cus-
tomers. Companies for which such contextual integrity
cannot be justified don't qualify to receive PI. CR-Hs are liable
and accountable for their subcontractors. For example, all
application service providers that reach out to Facebook cus-
tomers would be part of Facebook's (the CR-H's) controlled
space. Facebook would become accountable and liable for any
data breaches that occur within their partner network.
Context-based trust between customers, CR-Hs and service
providers are supported technically by accountability man-
agement platforms. These platforms manage the collection
and sharing of PI based on the PI usage policies negotiated
with customers. Through such platforms, accountability is
created and authorization, non-repudiation, separation, and
auditability of sharing practices are ensured. Legal safeguards
must back up the appropriate use of an accountability man-
agement platform.
Technically enforced accountability re-establishes trust
and transparency in personal data markets (Wef, 2012). To-
day's CR-Hs may have legitimate access to PI for specific
purposes. But once they share their PI with third parties, strict
compliance of that third party with the original terms of PI use
is not guaranteed. Even from the CR-H's point of view, PI is
flowing through a complex web of service providers that are
difficult to keep track of. As a result, it is difficult to hold third-
party service providers accountable. CR-Hs that collect PI and
are responsible for keeping it under control are placed at a
disadvantage. The following sections and Table 2 describe the
Table 2 e Legal and technical enablers in the CR-H-controlled data space.
Use of an accountability management
platform to enable and monitor
policy-compliant use of PI
PI usage policy languages
with standard vocabulary
Legal requirements Technical enablers
Liability of CR-holding company for handling PI in
accordance with electronic PI usage policies
x x
Obligation to implement and regularly audit the
accountability management platform
x
Separation of PI from multiple customers or
CR-holding companies
x
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technical enablers that support the legal requirements of
creating the CR-H-controlled data space.
4.2.1. Liability
In our market model, the CR-H is legally liable for any collec-
tion and use of PI that violates the agreed PI usage policies.
Liability arises for any violations by the CR-H itself or by any of
the service providers under its control. Liability of the CR-H is
natural from a customer perspective because the CR-H is the
single point of contact for the customer. Its liability corre-
sponds to customers' mental models. The interviews showed
that claiming liability for data misuse in civic courts today is
risky and expensive for customers because PI transactions are
opaque. Legal experts, therefore, recommend awaiver of costs
of litigation in data breach trials. “Data has a value, but in the
advocacy of my data I shall not pay legal charges.” [I9] Another
privilege proposed by experts is shifting the burden of proof
for proper data use (and lack of abuse) to the entity that
benefits from using the data. Typically, this entity will be the
CR-H. Our envisaged accountability management platform
provides a technological basis for proving proper data use.
4.2.2. Accountability management platform
Tomanage liability, the CR-H shall be responsible that all data
use is traced on a technical accountability management
platform. CR-Hs either implement the necessary account-
ability management platform by themselves or could use
platforms operated by public entities in public-law data cen-
ters such as the German ZIVIT, for example. Technically
enforced accountability ensures that any access, use, disclo-
sure, alteration, and deletion of PI can be traced back to the
originating party. Accountability management platforms
must comply with the requirements of authorization, non-
repudiation, separation, and auditability. First, authorization
requires that access to PI by the service provider is approved
by the CR-H on an individual transaction basis. When a
customer purchases a book, bookshop.com must explicitly
authorize a credit-scoring agency to use the customer data to
generate and provide the credit score of the customer. Second,
nonrepudiation prevents service providers from falsely
denying that they have accessed, used, altered or deleted PI.
Any use of PI shall be traceable and recorded in logs, as pro-
posed by those scholars who propagate auditability (Weitzner
et al., 2008) and accountability (Seneviratne, 2012). Third,
separation requires that PI originating from different service
transactions, customers, and CR-Hs is strictly isolated unless
the legitimate purpose allows for the combination of PI. This
measure safeguards contextual integrity and thus the mental
model of customers. Fourth, the platform should provide an
audit trail. PI usage policies and rights attached to all data are
used to demonstrate PI usage rights to authorities and audi-
tors. They may also be used as evidence in liability processes.
Early versions of such accountability management platforms
are already under development and referred to as “trust
frameworks” (Nguyen et al., 2013, p. 236) and “accountable
HTTP (HTTPA)” (Seneviratne, 2012).
4.2.3. Incentives of actors
CR-Hs have an incentive to implement an accountability
management platform, because such a platform is an asset
management tool in the end. The platform forces the service
providers in the CR-H's network into managing their PI assets
properly. Technical accountability brings intelligence and
control over customer's PI home to CR-Hs. CR-Hs are the only
parties that can analyze and use and thus benefit and mone-
tize their customer's PI. Consequently, they should also bear
the costs for operating the technical accountability manage-
ment platform. An accountability management platform
makes data flows and misuses of PI traceable. Technically
assured traces of the PI flows allow CR-Hs to show that PI was
handled in accordance with the agreed PI usage policy and the
law. In case CR-Hs detect violations of PI usage policies, they
can take redress against defecting service providers.
Technically enabled accountability management would
also prohibit CR-Hs to act as a gateway to shadow entities.
Privacy policies will clearly specify the one-visible-partner
who can legitimately collect and use personal information
from customers as well as aggregate profiles about them.
Unauthorized shadow entities would be immediately detected
on the accountability management platform automatically
checking PI usage policies and reported. Some CR-Hswould be
less forced into ‘data-deals’ with service partners.
4.2.4. Challenges
Setting up and operating an accountability management
platform is a highly complex and costly process. Multiple di-
mensions add to the complexity of guaranteeing traceability
of PI on an individual transaction basis: the number of
different organizational entities involved, the amount of PI
transactions, and the number of automated interactions
necessary between these organizational entities for a single
transaction. One expert argued “it is an additional complexity
level…We do not talk about simply managing an additional set of
data, but one has to check for each handling of personal datawhether
one is still allowed to access this data.”[I3] This complexity is
additionally driven by processing personal data in distributed
or remote systems, such as in cloud systems. Often, large
companies have no consolidated overview of data flows,
where this data is stored, and who has access to it [I9]. Thus,
for some companies it may imply a high effort and heavy in-
vestments to build up an accountability management system.
4.3. The 3rd market space: customer-controlled data
space
Privacy scholars and some start-up companies have suggested
relocating personal data into a sphere solely controllable by
customers. They have proposed identity management plat-
forms (e.g., PRIME and PRIMELife Project) that help customers
to manage their PI and the various identities linked to them.
The platforms act as intermediaries for customers, potentially
pulling services for them from the market. They take notes of
what customers have revealed to whom. In a more sophisti-
cated scenario, they mine personal activities and begin to
understand customers' preferences based on user-side data
mining (Lodder and Voulon, 2002). These preferences are then
used to support customers in their online activities such as
the search for product offerings. The customer-controlled
data space is enabled by trusted third parties and personal
data vaults. Compared to the CR-H-controlled data space,
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these offer customers increased control over PI storage loca-
tion, intelligence applied to PI, and PI deletion. Table 3 gives an
overview of the legal requirements and technical enablers
proposed for such a customer-controlled data space.
We have added a customer-controlled data space to our
original model version, because it will play an important role
in the future for privacy preservation. In fact, identity man-
agement systems have recently evolved to include personal
data vault technologies, such as user-centered social net-
works (Baden et al., 2009). In an entrepreneurial effort in Sili-
con Valley, Kaliya Hamlin, who calls herself “Identity
Woman”, has established the Personal Data Ecosystem (Pdec,
2014), which supports small companies with venture capital
access and knowledge to pursue a user-centric data-handling
strategy. In an extremely visionary way, Doc Searls proposed
the establishment of an “Intention Economy” (Mitchell et al.,
2008) where customers use personal agents or third parties
to pull services from companies rather than companies pro-
actively approaching customers and offering their services.
Trusted third parties and personal data vault technologies are
key for such ideas to thrive.
4.3.1. Trusted third parties
Trusted third parties manage personal data on behalf of cus-
tomers and mediate business relationships between cus-
tomers, CR-Hs and the safe harbor for big data. These third
parties act exclusively on behalf of customers and aim to give
them full control over their data. For example, InternetPost
AG's safe address platformmanages personal data that is used
by CR-H's on behalf of the customer (Internetpost, 2014).
Trusted third parties provide customers with client software
and possibly hardware that collects PI and securely transfers it
to the third party's repository. Customers can access, modify,
or delete their PI in that repository. They may grant CR-Hs
access to parts of their PI, which can be used to enhance a
business relationship. Personal agent technology operates on
top of a customer's data vault and third party infrastructure
creating a seamless PI flow from customers through third
parties to CR-Hs or the safe harbor for big data. Personal
agents may be provided to customers by their trusted third
party.
4.3.2. Personal data vaults
If customers do not want to store all of their PI with a third
party, they can use personal data vaults. Personal data vaults
are storage systems for PI which they operate themselves
(Mun et al., 2010). They can be as simple as plug computers
that are always online. The PI stored in data vaults can be
accessed by standardized protocols that enable interopera-
bility between the personal data vault of a customer and the
CR-H, potentially mediated by a third party (Narayanan et al.,
2012).
Personal data vaults enable customers to collect, store,
analyze, change, or delete PI without any other party being
involved.
4.3.3. Incentives of actors
For customers and CR-Hs, customer-controlled services offer
several advantages. Customers benefit from increased privacy
because they maintain tighter control over PI handling prac-
tices. Both in the trusted third party and or personal data vault
models customers' informational self-determination is
strengthened. They can decide where data is stored (storage
control), how it is analyzed (aggregation control), when it is
deleted (retention control) and how much is revealed (disclo-
sure control). When service providers interact with customers
in the customer-controlled data space, the customer, through
his or her trusted third party or personal data vault, is the
nexus of PI exchange. As a result, we presume that the
network of service providers through which personal data
flows will become less complex than it is today. Clear per-
ceptions of PI handling practices make users aware of these
practices and increase their perception of control (B€ohme,
2009). Furthermore, with PI handling practices under their
full control, users may build more trust in the parties handling
their data.
Table 3 e Legal and technical enablers in the customer-controlled data space.
Advanced
crypto-protocols
for a secure
exchange between
user clients
and trusted
third parties
Mutual
identity
assurance
standards
Software agent
technology:
Highly usable
customer
control over
settings,
ability to learn
privacy
preferences
Easy-to-use,
user-operated personal
data vaults
Policy languages
for data exchange
between customers
and companies
Legal requirements Technical enablers
Obligation of trusted third
parties to act on behalf
of the customer
x x
Obligation of trusted third
parties to keep PI of
customers secure
x x
Liability of CR-holding
company for handling PI
in accordance with
electronic PI usage policies
x x
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CR-Hs and their service providers benefit from lower
market-entry barriers, a higher legal certainty and higher data
quality. In the CR-H-controlled data space, seen the estab-
lished competition today, it is difficult for new market en-
trants to scale up because gaining access to a mass of
customers from which data can be collected is difficult.
Without enough data, companies cannot provide users with
the same service experience as established players. In fact,
most CR-Hs fail to achieve a critical customer base allowing
them to build positive network effects (Shapiro and Varian,
1998). In our customer-controlled data space, companies do
not need to obtain such a critical mass of customers; they can
access and obtain behavioral data from the safe harbor for big
data. Take the start-up of a new navigation and traffic service
company as an example. Today traffic data is monopolized by
a few big players, such as Google, Apple or TomTom. The
start-up has no chance to provide a comparable service
because it does not have access to real-time traffic data. In our
model anonymized traffic data is shared among all players.
The start-up can immediately start its new service.
CR-Hs also benefit from higher legal certainty because of better
predictable liability. CR-Hs liability is better predictable, because
they do not remain accountable for a complex and hard to
control network of service providers. Their liability is
restricted to have an accountability management platform in
place enabling them to proof their lawful own use of the data.
Rather than being in the role of data controllers, CR-Hs are just
temporary users of the PI stored at trusted third parties or in
personal data vaults that customers provide access to. Third,
CR-Hs benefit from higher data quality. As the data is stored and
maintained under customer control at trusted third parties or
in personal data vaults, companies get data firsthand. The risk
of operating on “dirty data”, data which is wrong, outdated, or
inaccurate, is reduced (Strong et al., 1997; Kim et al., 2003).
The interview results support the idea that trusted third
party services may be a viable business model. Experts argue
that managing customer preferences is a business model
different from targeting CR-H offers to customers, but current
advertising networks have the operational knowhow to
migrate into such a business [W]. Trusted third parties could
finance their operations from a commission imposed on
successful leads mediated between customers and CR-Hs.
‘Soft IDs’, user pseudonyms issued by the trusted third party
in the course of a transaction, may also allow trusted third
parties to take over the role of financial- or identity brokers
[W].
4.3.4. Challenges
The customer-controlled data space counts on the emancipa-
tion of customers and on their time investment in the man-
agement of their PI. Customers with a high internal locus of
control (Xu, 2010) will be at an advantage to capitalize on
informational self-determination. Customers must make a
number of decisions on their own: selecting a trusted third
party, deciding on operating a personal data vault, or deter-
mining when PI shall be deleted. One expert highlights that
research is required on whether “the market is actually ready or
whether it is only a niche model for the enlightened”[I13]. Currently
available personal data vaults are difficult to use. They require
custom configuration and the installation of additional
software and hardware (Narayanan et al., 2012). Effort has to
bemade to get customer-controlled data technologies to reach
a wider audience than a few select innovators.
Trusted third parties can be a single point of failure because
they bundle the trust of customers and the risk of storing
extensive electronic identities. Regarding security, third
parties must consider not only the storage of PI, but also how
PI can be transferred to and accessed by them. One prereq-
uisite is therefore secure interfaces to trusted third parties,
advanced crypto-protocols that allow for a secure exchange of
PI between user clients and trusted third parties. Experts point
out that these interfaces need to be trusted and prevent
impersonation; it would be necessary to “get to a point where
one can authenticate electronically without doubt” [I10].
4.4. The 4th market space: safe harbor for big data
A core component of our market model is the safe harbor for
big data. This part of the market contains anonymized PI for
all players. We use the term ‘people data’ for anonymized PI.
Customers can voluntarily ‘donate’ their data to the safe
harbor for big data. For example, individuals may share their
navigation patterns with the safe harbor for big data so
anyone can benefit from traffic congestion information. CR-Hs
and trusted third parties may transfer data to the safe harbor
for big data on behalf of their customers. Each time PI is
transferred to the safe harbor for big data, it must cross the
‘anonymity frontier’. Based on a principle of reciprocity,
everyone has equal access to the data stored in safe harbor for
big data. Entities may only draw data from the space if they
contribute proportionally to it.
4.4.1. Open people data and reciprocity
People data (anonymized personal data) in the safe harbor
could be considered a public commons. Similar to a creative
commons zero (CC0) license, the purpose of the use of people
data cannot be restricted. Datamay be used for commercial or
noncommercial purposes without providing attribution, and
new data may be derived. Open people data does not imply
that it is free. Providers may host the infrastructure of a safe
harbor for big data, charging a nondiscriminatory access fee to
cover operational costs. The safe harbor should foresee the
reciprocity of data exchange: entities are allowed to use data
from the safe harbor for big data only when they contribute to
the space proportionally. Proportional contribution may not
be understood in terms of data volume, but in terms of an
entity's individual ability to contribute. And no entity should
be excluded from gaining access if the entity fulfills the
requirement of reciprocity. The following paragraphs discuss
the legal requirements and technical enablers to build a safe
harbor for big data (Table 4).
4.4.2. Anonymity frontier
The safe harbor for big data is a privacy commons, a shared
space of anonymity. When data enters the safe harbor for big
data, it crosses the boundaries of a customer relationship's
contextual integrity. PI therefore has to be anonymized at the
anonymity frontier. Anonymization would need to occur ac-
cording to ‘best available techniques’ (BATs) for anonymiza-
tion (see Section 4.5.1 below for more detail). The latest
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technical anonymization concepts such as k-anonymity
(Sweeney, 2002), l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) and
t-closeness (Li et al., 2007) would need to be combined and
regularly reviewed by a global group of experts to ensure that
data passing the anonymity frontier sees indeed a strong de-
gree of data generalization. The BATs could include such
guidelines as a k-anonymity-threshold level (for instance a
threshold of k ¼ 100), meaning that only those entities can
contribute people data that can allow for this degree of ano-
nymization. This means that PI in some contexts may not be
viable to be anonymized at all. For instance, PI from genetic
research cannot be viably anonymized, because an in-
dividual's footprint is so unique that the number of people
sharing the same genetic characteristics is effectively zero
(k ¼ 1). Depending on industry-specific privacy risk assess-
ments certain domains would therefore need to be excluded
from distributing PI to the safe harbor for big data.
Creating such a ‘safe harbor for big data’ requires courage
of policy makers to deviate from how data protection au-
thorities want to restrict the use of anonymized data today. Up
to now, the UK's Information Commissioner's Office inter-
preted the EU data protection directive that “consent is
generally not needed to legitimise an anonymisation” (Ico,
2012, p. 28). In 2014, however, the Art. 29 Working Party pub-
lished its opinion that even for anonymized data the purpose
limitation principle would need to be followed and a grounds
for legitimate processing (e.g., informed consent) would be
required (Art29WP, 2014, p. 7). Seen that there are no globally
accepted BATs for anonymization, this position seems justi-
fied. There is no rigorous ‘anonymity frontier’ as we envision
it here (see Section 4.5) and hence there is a risk that data is
being circulated and used as ‘anonymous’ which is easily
identifiable. There is also no criminal prosecution for re-
identification. Against this background the Art. 29 WP is
wisely suggesting to apply the same rules of caution to data
that is called ‘anonymous’ as to identified data. As we will
outline below, though, our approach to anonymization is very
rigorous from a technical and legal standpoint. And against
this background we argue in line with the UK's ICO (Ico, 2012)
that the positive societal benefits that could arise from open
people data should be leveraged.
4.4.3. Incentives of actors
The main motivation to introduce a safe harbor for big data is
innovation. Across all industries, data-driven companies tend
to be robustlymore productive andmore successful than their
low-volume data competitors (Mcafee and Brynjolfsson, 2012).
Big data has the potential to improve the quality of decisions
in all areas of life, where previously only small sample sizes or
exclusively qualitative arguments have been considered
(Mayer-Sch€onberger and Cukier, 2013). For example, big
anonymous people data was used to predict the spread of
malaria in Kenya, to analyze population migration after the
Haitian earthquake in 2010 and to understand the socio-
economic development of communities in the UK
(Unglobalpulse, 2013). Currently, however, truly big people
data is only available to a few major corporations, most of
which are based in the U.S. (i.e., Google, Apple, Facebook,
Amazon, major national portals). These companies can
leverage their customer's data to re-enforce their quasi-
monopolistic market positions. Smaller companies, in
contrast, have difficulty ramping up innovative services
because they cannot access a database of user behavior,
which is often needed for service design. For example, offering
an innovative traffic jam warning system is difficult if
congestion information is oligopolized by Apple's, Google's
and TomTom's map services. Granting access to people data
in the safe harbor for big data on equal terms to all market
players globally could reduce winner-take-all dynamics in data
markets generally.Market-entry barrierswould be reduced for
smaller companies, paving the way for vital competition
(Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Monopolization of insights into
social behavior will be limited. One effect could then be that
the competitive edge of companies will shift from amassing PI
to competition based on characteristics of service quality. A
company's success will not depend on having the most data
any more, but being able to make the best sense out of the
anonymized people data for the user. Competition based on
intelligence, functionality, and usability is stimulated.
Consequently, customers will benefit from additional value
extracted from anonymized people data while maintaining
privacy.
Data donations to the safe harbor for big data may be
driven by philanthropy and altruism as well as the desire to
improve service quality. In fact, people already donate data.
For instance, users send reports on crashed applications and
usage patterns to application providers for fixing bugs or
improving application quality. “Identity woman” Kaliya
Hamlin calls this practice “data raindrops”.
4.4.4. Challenges
There is no such thing as perfect anonymity. By now it is clear
that with sufficient third-party data, money and motivation
there is a residual privacy risk whenmalicious attackers want
Table 4 e Legal and technical enablers in the safe harbor for big data.
Publicly accessible
infrastructure hosting
safe big data
Anonymization technology
used at anonymity frontier
Accountability management
platform monitoring
policy-compliant use of PI
Legal enablers Technical enablers
Open, reciprocal access to safe big data x
Legal anonymity requirement in
‘safe harbor for big data’
x x
Sanctions for violation of anonymity
requirement
x
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to re-identify data donators (Ohm, 2010; Bambauer et al.,
2014). We recognize and embrace this threat. Just as with
physical locks that we use to close apartments and cars we
believe that anonymization is a ‘good-enough lock’ for
ensuring a high level of privacy for amajority of people.We do
not deny that the door may be forced open, but we argue that
despite the residual risk of re-identification the level of pri-
vacy would be very high in a safe-harbor for anonymity. This
is, first, because re-identification is legally penalized in our
model. It is criminally pursued and prosecuted (see Section
4.5.2). And second, the protection of people data can also be
technically supported: information downloaded from the safe
harbor for big data can be watermarked with an irremovable
sticky policy for instance, making re-identified information
immediately visible to auditors and authorities. With such
watermarking we would also prohibit what Paul Ohm has
called a “release-and-forget” practice once data is anony-
mized (Ohm, 2010, p. 1711). “Release-and-forget” means that
data is made public without ever tracing the further purposes
of its use.
Moreover, we want to make a remark on the final risks for
people caused by re-identification. This risk includes the
amount of psychological, financial or physical harm that
would be caused by an act of re-identification. The original
motivation of data protection regulation is to minimize
serious risks for people; to not get hurt. But in many cases re-
identification of data does not cause harm to people. The
humanitarian and societal consequences of seeing some in-
stances of re-identification would probably not be devas-
tating. As Ohm (2010) argues, policy makers need to move
away from anonymization math to sociology. What counts is
the potential risk for people after people data's re-
identification, not the act of re-identification itself.
Besides those arguments on the technical limitations of
anonymity, an economic challenge has been brought forward.
One was that there could be an imbalance between those who
contribute data and those who profit (as is the case in today's
data markets). The practice of downloading data from the
harbor without contributing to it could be argued to threaten
the quality of this big data pool in the long run. However, in
our model vision, the safe harbor for big data discourages this
practice by allowing access to data only on the basis of reci-
procity. Fairness is guaranteed by requiring proportional
contribution to the space when data is consumed. Even when
there are no perfect reciprocal contributions, evidence from
open source software communities shows that similar ex-
change systems work when the number of contributors is
skewed (Lessig, 2006).
While the safe harbor for big data offers a lot of open data,
its user might not be able to extract a lot of information from
it. Because the data is available to everyone, the economic
value of the information approaches zero over time. Data posted to
the safe harbor for big data evolves from a common good that
people compete for to a shared public good over time. Also
poor analytical capabilities could be the reason. Companies
may give priority to statistical correlations turning up in the
vast amount of data instead of analyzing meaningful causal
relationships providing utility to service users (Mayer-
Sch€onberger and Cukier, 2013). “It's easier to get the data in
than out” (Jacobs, 2009, p. 69).
Moreover, a tradeoff exists between fragmentation of the
safe harbor for big data and its scalability. On the one hand, a
fragmented safe harbor for big data is consisting of smaller,
open repositories that focus on a narrow range of data within
a domain. The utility of fragmented spaces would be limited.
But they would be easier to deploy and be adopted by market
participants more quickly. On the other hand, a comprehen-
sive space containing a higher volume of different types of
data from versatile application domains would provide high
utility, but it may not be scalable and involve higher risks of
unauthorized re-identification.
4.5. Standardized anonymity frontier
The anonymity frontier separates identified, personal data
from non-identifiable, anonymous information in the market.
PI crossing the anonymity frontier has to be sufficiently ano-
nymized so that re-identification is not “likely reasonable”.1
What constitutes sufficient anonymity is defined in a gener-
ally accepted standard for anonymization based on timely
best-available techniques (BATs) for anonymization.
Adhering to BATs, engineers and operators of anonymizing
information systems need to ensure that information meets a
reasonably safe level of anonymity using best-available
techniques. Possibly operators may automatically check the
anonymity level by support of algorithms. Reasonably ano-
nymized information may be shared and freely exchanged
without restrictions. To secure customer's privacy at the an-
onymity frontier, heavy legal sanctions need to be imposed on
those who do not respect it (Table 5).
The benefits of a standardized anonymity frontier are
manifold: First, standardized anonymitywill shift competition
Table 5 e Legal and technical enablers of the anonymity frontier.
Anonymization
technology
Accountability management
platform monitoring
policy-compliant use of PI
Legal enablers Technical enablers
Best available techniques reference documents defining best available anonymity x
Auditing of adherence to best available anonymization techniques x
Sanctions for violation of anonymity requirement x
Right to freely exchange information with standardized anonymity x
1 See Recital 26 of directive 95/46/EC provisioning that “account
should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used
either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said
person”.
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on data access to other characteristics of a service (e.g., qual-
ity). There shall be no competition on privacy. From a funda-
mental rights perspective, all individuals have an inalienable
core of personal privacy regardless of their socioeconomic
status or market power.2 To guarantee a universal minimum
level of what constitutes non-identified use of information
outside of privacy boundaries, standards for reasonable ano-
nymity are required. Standardized anonymity also reduces the
transaction costs of companies that use data. Companies save
on the costs of defining and individually negotiating what
constitutes reasonable anonymity (e.g., required size of the
anonymity set (Sweeney, 2002)) for each type of transaction.
Rather, they can rely on collectively accepted standards of
anonymization for a given type of transaction. For example,
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission clarified the standard of
“reasonable linkability” to provide companies with a
commonly accepted interpretation (Ftc, 2012, p. 18). Accepted
standards expose them to smaller risks for damage to their repu-
tation. Companies affected by a breach of anonymization can
defend accusations of misconduct and avoid liability by
proving that state-of-the-art anonymity standards were fol-
lowed. Also, the risks of misguided investment in unac-
knowledged anonymization technology are reduced. Finally,
the unrestricted use of de-identified data is facilitated for
companies. Companies often use aggregated data relating to a
group of individuals. The standardized anonymity frontier al-
lows companies to share anonymous data with any other en-
tity, in-house or outside of the company, without user consent
or adhering to data protection regulations. Even though data
protection regulations will not be applicable to anonymous
data in our model, companies still need to obey privacy laws,3
for example to prevent that unfair automatic decisions are
taken based on anonymous people data.
4.5.1. Best available anonymity
What constitutes sufficient anonymization is a dynamic
concept dependent on the state-of-the-art of technology.
Regulators should document and update current standards
for anonymization in so called “BREF”s, best available tech-
niques reference documents (IPPC, Directive 2010/75/EU). The
definition of BATs for anonymity in BREFs follows procedures
of global co-regulation in which recognized and trusted ex-
perts take part. Currently, the concepts of k-anonymity
(Sweeney, 2002), l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) and
t-closeness (Li et al., 2007) suggest that it is sufficient to have a
large anonymity set of individuals, diverse attribute values
and similar attribute value distributions. The fact that best
available anonymity techniques can be successfully defined
has been demonstrated by the processing of customer health
data in German pharmacists' information system (Giesen and
Schnoor, 2013).
Because of their brisance for the protection-level of the
anonymity frontier, the definition of best available anonymity
standards need to follow a transparent process. Public
representatives (e.g., NGOs such as EFF4 or EDRi5) should be
able to participate in writing down BREFs for anonymity. This
high level of transparency and participation can be achieved
by holding BAT standardization meetings in public and
running through a request for comment (RFC) process6 after
initial draft rounds. Also, to incorporate advances in re-
identification technology and computing power, BAT stan-
dards can be regularly updated, for example following a cycle
of every three years.
The experts highlighted the relativity of the anonymity
concept pointing out rightfully that there is no absolute ano-
nymity. “You don't actually need that much external infor-
mation to add to the information you have got to allow you
identification” one expert [I1] highlighted. Virtually any large
data set having a high entropy can be de-anonymized; a U.S.
inhabitant, for instance, from which only ZIP code, date of
birth and gender is known can be identified with a probability
of 87% by his or her real name (Sweeney, 2002). And with the
big data trend, entropy in data sets is rising swiftly
(Rubinstein, 2012). Despite these mathematical limitations of
anonymization (Ohm, 2010), experts are convinced that ano-
nymization “will be essence in the future” [I3]. From practical
experience, experts report that the k-anonymity-threshold
level can often be increased with low technical effort [I9]. For
instance, for many applications only the year of birth, not the
exact date of birth needs to be recorded. Another misguided
argument against anonymization is that individual charac-
teristics are known with certainty. Consider a dataset in
which 20 attributes are known with 80% probability. Because
probabilities multiply for all attributes, there is only a 1.15%
chance (0.8 to the power of 20 attributes) that the profile
accurately describes an individual. In online advertising user
interest profiles, for instance, attributes are almost never
known with certainty and profiles are incomplete with many
data points missing [W]. “Often the approach [to anonymiza-
tion] is too much Newton, but we have to go for Heisenberg”
[W].
4.5.2. Sanctions
To guarantee that best available anonymity standards are
obeyed and can be effectively enforced, penalties and dam-
ages for the illegal acquisition, possession, use or sale of
identifiable information are necessary. Sanctions protect a
trustworthy market regime. Therefore, sanctions are required
even in case no harm was caused. If any entity outside the
contextual boundaries of a customer relationship is caught
engaging in PI storage or processing to which it is not entitled
(because no authorization policies can be provided), it shall
not only pay damages to customers, CR-Hs and others but also
pay substantial punitive damages (Traung, 2012, p. 42).
Moreover, any natural persons involved in the illegal activities
shall face criminal prosecution, as they have encroached upon
the fundamental rights of other individuals.
2 See Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.
3 In contrast to data protection regulation, the Art. 29 Working
party names the e-Privacy directive, Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 7 of the
EU charter of Fundamental Rights as example (Art29WP, 2014).
4 Electronic Frontier Foundation.
5 European Digital Rights initiative.
6 RFC processes are well-known participatory community pro-
cesses in the Internet-domain and have been successfully adop-
ted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to develop and
norm foundational technical standards for the Internet.
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4.5.3. Incentives of actors
Customers and data-using companies have opposing incentives
as to which standard for anonymity shall be defined in best
available techniques reference documents. While consumers
favor strong definitions of anonymity, data-using companies
prefer weak anonymization technologies and administrative
measures. “The anonymity frontier shifts by the best available
techniques standard; there is an enormous pressure to improve this
standard while there are economic incentives to research less on
anonymity.”[I6] one expert characterized the situation. For
such a system to work, therefore, roughly equal powers must
come to the negotiating table. Consumer and privacy pressure
groups as well as industry representatives need to reach a
balanced agreement on what is deemed sufficient anonym-
ization. Anonymity BREFs need to strike a balance between
privacy and data utility.
Some companies may also try undercutting what is defined
as the minimum standard of anonymity. “The more comprehensive
the data, the more valuable it is” one expert [I6] concluded. Some
companies outside of the contextual boundaries of a customer
relationship may be encouraged to re-identify data. But the
marginal utility from identification outside of such relation-
ships is likely to be sominimal that the ensuing risks of getting
caught are not justified. Severe sanctions also deter this illegal
behavior. Laws can be effectively enforced by tracing the audit
trail of PI recorded in the accountability management platform
that customer-relationship companies need to implement.
4.5.4. Challenges
High security requirements and trust is put into the points
responsible for anonymization. Anonymization itself has to
be a minimum vulnerability procedure: “high trust is required
into this anonymity services, because, unfortunately, it occurs that
such data is stolen frequently...Whoever gets certified… [by a best
available anonymity standard] should ensure that the data are not
hackable” [I2] one expert says. A company's information se-
curity management system has to recognize that interfaces at
the anonymity frontier represent vulnerable targets. There-
fore, one expert argues, one “needs administrative controls”,
because “purely technical controls are necessary, but in no case
sufficient.” [I6].
Another challenge is drawing the exact line of the contex-
tual border within a group of companies or possibly the company
itself. One industry expert of a customer relationship holding
company [I4] pointed out that “for instance, there is the pro-
curement department…These [the data] are absolutely anonymized.”
Especially the corporate headquarters often would not accept
that identified customer data of subsidiaries cannot be used
for other purposes in other companies a legal expert high-
lighted. Large international organizations may therefore have
to invest substantial effort to disentangle and elucidate in-
ternal flows of PI.
5. Leveraging existing research for the four-
space vision
Technical enablers support the enforcement of our model's
legal requirements. Many existing technology alternatives can
implement our model's vision. This section summarizes the
technologies that our model could build on and identifies
areas in which new technologies are required.
In the model spaces that operate on identified information,
PI usage policies governwhat companies are allowed to dowith
PI, for instance, specifying usage purpose, retention time and
obligations. To specify the content of PI usage policies, various
policy languages are available, some with a within-enterprise
scope (e.g., EPAL), and others contemplated to be used on a
web scale (e.g., PrimeLife's policy language). However, to date,
no uniformly accepted global standard for electronically rep-
resenting PI usage policies has emerged. The most complete
standard that has been put into force, but not adopted by
companies is theP3PstandardpublishedbytheW3C(P3p,2006).
Harmonizing efforts based on recognized standards within the
eXtensible Markup Language's framework are needed.
Negotiating PI usage policies between CR-Hs and cus-
tomers is a laborious and time-consuming task. Software
agents that can semantically understand PI usage policy con-
tent and automatically negotiate policies respecting the
customer preferences are required. Many browsers' Do Not
Track functionality can negotiate binary policies containing PI
disclosure or secrecy (Wang and Cranor, 2011). However, us-
able agents that can handle the full complexity of PI usage
purposes are required. The P3P standard (P3p, 2006), for
instance, made a first advance in this direction.
Visibility and identity of the CR-Hs to the user can be
ensured by user interface and technological means. Stan-
dardized graphical user interface symbols have been designed to
indicate PI usage practices to users (e.g., Hansen, 2009). Also
nutrition labels have been put forth (Cranor, 2012). But simple,
easily understandable symbols signaling who the one visible
CR-H is to users have still not been deployed. On a technical
level, existing identity assurance standards such as SAML (Oasis,
2008) are needed to secure the authenticity of interacting
agents and parties.
To manage and store PI usage policies and associated PI
under user control, policy repositories and personal data vaults
are required. Existing platforms provide repositories for
limited areas, such as social networking (e.g., Lockr, Persona)
or PI management (e.g., MyLifeBits). However, we lack tech-
nologies that are interoperable with any software agents and
that can manage any type of PI. To ensure secure communi-
cation of PI between the entities interacting in distributed,
customer-controlled PI-management environments, advanced
crypto-protocolsmust be employed. For instance, fair exchange
protocols could be used to guarantee that companies do not
tap PI from repositories without providing in return the
desired customized service to the user (Asokan et al., 1998).
To ensure accountable, policy-compliant use of PI,
different accountability management platforms have been pro-
posed. Sticky policies attach PI usage policies as metadata to
the PI (e.g., Pearson and Mont, 2011). Trusted computing
platforms controlled by the CR-H can track the enforcement of
sticky PI usage policies. These policies are currently under
development and often discussed under the term “trust
frameworks” (Nguyen et al., 2013, p. 236). First steps towards
auditability and traceability of PI use on thewebweremade by
accountable data exchange protocols such as HTTPA
(Seneviratne, 2012).
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Providing a reciprocal, open access safe harbor for big data
requires technologies that make people data redundantly and
publicly available to market participants. Peer-to-peer data
hosting architectures like Freenet (Clarke et al., 2001) would
allow for the creation of a safe harbor for big data without
revealingwho contributes to and uses data from the space. For
anonymizing PI at the anonymity frontier, standardized and
trustworthy anonymization technologies are required. Privacy-
preserving data mining technologies, for example, allow
users to analyze large amounts of safe big data without
jeopardizing its anonymity (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008).
6. Enforcing the four-space vision
A key challenge to the four-space vision is its enforceability.
We proposed various interlocking technical and legal mech-
anisms to make data markets work, but these need to be
globally implemented and enforced to be real bridges for safe
data exchange across continents. Recent years have shown
how difficult it is to reach international consensus on data
protection or privacy and to enforce agreed provisions. The
Safe Harbor Agreement between the U.S. and Europe on data
handling practices has been quoted as an example of failure. A
more effective path could be to implement and enforce
binding law for data protection. To pave the way for interna-
tionally enforcing our model, we propose five building blocks
based on harmonized hard law:
 technical and process standards,
 internal compliance procedures,
 external audits,
 sanctions,
 and damage claims for customers.
This five-partite enforcement strategy already proved
effective for increasing consumer safety in many other areas,
such as in the food and automotive industries to ensure hy-
giene or safety standards, for instance.
Globally binding technical and process standards for
handling data in accordance with our model need to be
defined. For example, specifying best-available techniques
reference documents (BREFs) can provide a globally harmo-
nized base for acceptable levels of anonymization. As a first
step towards defining at least transatlantic standard bridges,
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the (envisaged)
European Data Protection Board (EDPB) could co-operate to
specify the proposedmeasures and then have themmandated
by their respective regulatory bodies. In Europe this could be
the European Commission who could do so through the
delegated acts instrument foreseen in the upcoming European
data protection regulation.
To ensure internal compliance and satisfy themselves with
their processes handling PI, CR-Hs would need to conduct
regular internal audits of their data handling processes (as is
done for most business critical processes today). Auditing is
facilitated by the technical accountability management plat-
form we propose which enables reliable tracking of PI flows.
Ensuring internal compliance goes in line with current calls
for regular privacy impact assessments and obtaining certified
privacy seals.
In the long-run it is probably necessary to have indepen-
dent and external auditors check the proper handling of per-
sonal data processing and to check the operation of the
accountability management platform. Similar to the pro-
visions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on financial reporting, CR-
Hs cannot get approval of further operating their data ser-
vices if they cannot testify regular audit reports to supervisory
authorities. Furthermore, CR-Hs should be obliged to notify
the supervisory authorities of any irregular incidents or se-
curity breaches detected on the accountability management
platform; a measure similar to the ‘data breach notifications’
that are now foreseen in the upcoming EU data protection
regulation and that have been proven successful practice in
many U.S. states. If there is particular suspicion of miscon-
duct, data protection authorities or the FTC in the U.S. could
conduct external audits by themselves.
If rules are not obeyed, internationally harmonized, effec-
tive sanctions should be a last remedy for enforcing the four-
space model. Currently existing data protection sanctioning
systems are inhomogeneous, with comprehensive, but
‘toothless’ sanctions in the EU and only punctual, but tuff
penalties in the U.S. One point of reference towards a globally
harmonized sanctioning systems could be the current EU data
protection regulation proposal to fine infringers up to 2% of
their annual worldwide turnover (Art. 79 (Ep, 2013)).
Giving customers an effective enforcement tool as well,
they should have a harmonized claim for damages that result
from violations against the provisions of our four-space
model. Because determining the height of damages is chal-
lenging, tables of minimum damages would need to be
developed as proposed by Traung (2012, p. 42). To give cus-
tomers an active role in enforcing their rights, they shall have
a direct right to file actions.
7. Discussion
Our vision for a personal information market establishes
compromise between players in the current PI ecosystem and
data protection proponents. Our model embraces data rich-
ness as the future of a digital economy and creates room for
information-rich services and data trading as well as identi-
fied customer relationships. At the same time, our technical
suggestions to help enforcing legal regulation empower peo-
ple to participate in PI markets with their privacy protected.
Supporting people to understand their transactions with
companies and the value of their PI, we create a new and
simple market structure that assigns template rights and ob-
ligations to all market players. Although this benefit applies to
customers, who will have more trust in the face of market
transparency, it also aids companies and legal enforcers.
Most of the legal requirements and technical enablers we
propose are not new. They have been proposed for over two
decades by researchers in privacy, identity and security
research and debated by companies and regulators. However,
no one has demonstrated how all of the puzzle pieces could be
arranged in a market model to benefit both people and com-
panies. No one has holistically discussed how the interaction
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of privacy-enhancing technologies and law can actively sup-
port a new and simplemarket regime, one that promisesmore
clarity and accountability in business transactions as well as
new streams of income. The model should not be misunder-
stood as a finalized legal and technological regulatory frame-
work in which its components are not open for further
development and extension. Also, our model is intentionally
not oriented at the body of existing jurisprudence and does
not discuss problems of legal integration that may ensue in
particular legislations. Rather, it should be regarded as a ‘so-
cial plastic’ that provides a visionary route to design and
change personal data markets for privacy. Most importantly,
this plastic is not only originating from the legal discipline, but
also covers the proposals made in computer science.
A core benefit of our model is its main technical challenge:
the creation of a safe harbor for big data, a free market space
that ensures anonymity. Ensuring anonymity becomes more
difficult as technology becomes more powerful, facilitating
identification. However, reasonable anonymity for people
data will suffice if the privacy risks in case of re-identification
are minimized. Sufficient anonymity can be secured if regu-
lators enforce the anonymity requirement through rigorous
sanctions for misconduct and if data protection authorities
define strong and timely “BATs” (Best Available Techniques)
(Directive 2010/75/EU).
A bitter pill that companies have to swallow is to finally
provide people with a privacy-friendly default service option.
But, as we show in this article, it isn't that a drop of bitterness.
Companies can re-enter competition on the basis of service
qualities. Furthermore, our model meets the privacy prefer-
ences of different individuals: Access to content at potentially
lower cost for those who are willing to ‘pay’ with their PI and
alternative versions for customers that are concerned about
their data. Data protection rights proponents may argue that
this preference-based market structure disadvantages the
poor, who may be forced to sell their PI. This argument is true
only if marketers choose to have people pay for the privacy-
friendly version. Marketers could also make the data-rich
version more attractive from a service perspective e with
greater functionality and no ads e while offering a baseline
service with non-personalized ads in an unfiltered and non-
manipulated way.
To enable fair competition inmarketswith default privacy-
friendly service versions, we suggest regulating the identified
market space. Onemarket regulationmay be enforcing a price
cap and a minimum service quality obligation for privacy-
friendly services. Price regulation is common for many ser-
vice and product areas including books, public housing, utili-
ties, parks and roads. And even if people are asked to paymore
than they do now, we argue that other services areas have
seen successful transitions from an initial free offering to
paid-for offerings as well; for example, the short message
service (SMS) has become an important source of income for
mobile operators even though it was initially a free byproduct
of telephony services. Finally, even if individuals opt to use
their PI in exchange for the service, we believe that ourmarket
proposal creates ample room for privacy protection: After all,
companies would be accountable and liable for how they use
PI. Limitless reuse and repackaging out of PI's original context
would be outlawed. Privacy risks would hence be limited even
for those who share. As customers will have ownership rights
to their PI, they will also be brought back to the negotiating
table. Ownership rights, a right to privacy-friendly service
options and defaults, company accountability and a trans-
parent market structure promise to re-establish the trust we
need to see information services flourish.
The customer-controlled data space gives customers a
new, self-contained way of managing their data. Our model
recognizes customer-controlled data and CR-H-controlled
data as equal control regimes. Customers managing their
data in personal data vaults do not only have self-determined
control. Personal data vaults also make customers ‘feel’ their
ownership claim and give data into their hands. A whole new
industry of trusted third parties and operators of ‘personal
cloud’ services is evolving, enabling alternative and privacy-
friendly ways of monetizing on customer data.
Finally, one more fundamental challenge of our model
must be considered: the ownership claim to information. The
idea that personal data could be recognized as a kind of
property originated in the U.S.. This idea has been met by the
criticism that people shouldn't be “propertized” (Noam, 1997;
Cohen, 1999) as well as a series of other arguments (for an
overview see Schwartz (2003)). Ralph Waldo Emerson once
remarked: “As long as our civilization is essentially one of
property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be mocked by
delusions.“ For these reasons, we view the idea of legal
property rights to PI critically. However, because markets
already treat PI as their property, we ask only that people get
the same rights that companies have already claimed for
themselves and that we bring people back to the negotiating
table. An ownership claim would not substitute, but rather
enhance the human rights basis of privacy (Purtova, 2011). In
Europe, it would provide people with better access to existing,
well-proven enforcement structures. Customers could effec-
tively claim their rights to PI on their own instead of calling on
data protection authorities only. Even though data protection
authorities have tried to support customers in cases of data
breach, their effectiveness is limited. Most importantly, they
do not have the capacity to handle the volume of cases that
require settlement in personal data markets. It therefore
seems more appropriate to give people access to existing
market structures and tool sets.
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